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Philosophers of biology, along with evolutionary biologists, have tended to dismiss the Gaïa hypothesis 
since its inception, and quite promptly so. An entire book on the Gaia hypothesis written by a prominent 
and pioneering figure of (history and) philosophy of biology since the early 1970’s, and who is a 
convinced Darwinist, Michael Ruse, is thus more than welcome. I was curious to read the book and took 
pleasure and interest in it. 
Ruse’s intimate knowledge of the actors involved in evolutionary biology as well as the numerous 
interviews on which the book relies on contribute to the delivery of a particularly rich and vivid book. 
However, the target of the book is not the content of the Gaïa hypothesis itself but rather its reception, a 
move that allows Ruse to make more general points regarding the overall dynamic of science. 
The first two chapters lay down the groundwork for the central question of the book: why was the Gaïa 
hypothesis so violently rejected by professional scientists and so warmly welcomed by the public opinion?  
The next four chapters look far before Gaia. The first one deals with “living” conceptions of the “world” 
going from Plato to Schelling. Three intellectual frameworks, pervasive since the XIXth century, are then 
distinguished for the purpose of understanding Gaïa in historical context:  
a. Mechanism – Ruse retains two attributes (constancy of laws, the world is machine-like) and link 
them to biologists and geologists (Hutton, Lyell, Darwin);  
b. Organicism – used somewhat exchangeably with holism or emergentism: under this label, Ruse 
captures a history going from Spencer to Wright through Henderson and Allee; 
c. Hylozoism – Ruse discusses under this concept the ideas of Steiner, ecological philosophies 
(Thoreau, Leopold, Carson, Naess) and neo-pagans. Dealing with the idea that the world is living, 
this chapter seemed to me the most original and colourful of the four devoted to broad historical 
questions. Indeed, scientific critiques of the Gaïa hypothesis have often conjured up New Age 
movements as a scarecrow which should repel us from the Gaïa hypothesis: with such a detailed 
presentation of neo-pagans ideas, and Gaia’s reception therein, Ruse makes a decisive 
contribution. 
The role played by these four chapters seems to be, firstly, to show that the public opinion has already 
been in contact with romantic or organic conceptions of the “world”, and was thus prepared for accepting 
Gaïa; secondly, these chapters underlie the existence of a persistent and lively organicist tradition in (the 
life) sciences that under various (sometimes radically distinct) modes consistently opposed mechanist 
views ever since the Scientific Revolution.  
The other major contribution of the book consists in dismantling three intellectual traditions within the 
Gaia-sphere: Lovelock is the mechanist; Margulis is the organicist; and the neo-pagans are the hylozoists. 
To support this very stimulating interpretation that contrasts Lovelock as a mechanist with the co-author 
of the Gaïa hypothesis (Margulis) and with other supporters of Gaïa, Ruse offers several good arguments: 
the career of Lovelock as engineer and great inventor of exquisitely sensitive machines; Lovelock as 
fellow of the conservative royal society; and finally, his way of arguing through a mathematical and 
computational model (Daisyworld) - something Margulis would never have considered. However, besides 
the verbal claims about emergence and holism early made by Lovelock alone (in the 1972 letter to 
Atmospheric environment, “Gaïa as seen through the atmosphere”, and constantly since), two elements do 
not fit in this picture and are not mentioned in the book. An important brand of mechanism – the one to 
which Ruse refers to here – contends that there is no strong division between physical and biological 
phenomena. But since its first formulation, the very core of Lovelock’s version of the Gaïa hypothesis has 
always relied on a very strong distinction between biotic and abiotic phenomena, as magnified in the early 
comparison of Mars, Venus and Earth’s atmospheres, and as exemplified later in the Daisyworld models 
intended to compare biotic and abiotic scenarios (Dutreuil, “What good are abstract and what-if models? 
Lessons from the Gaïa hypothesis”, this volume). Moreover, this thesis – about Lovelock as a traditional 
mechanist –, as grounded and stimulating as it is, still fails to take into account the strong (and very 
constant since 1972) appeal of Lovelock himself to what he calls an alternative conception of nature. 
In the penultimate chapter, Ruse examines the reception of Gaïa by “professional scientists”. He recalls 
that back in the 1970’s and 1980’s, professional science was “under attack” from several sides 
(Foucaldian ideas, feminist movements, environmentalists). Evolutionary biology, in particular, was in an 
insecure institutional position due to internal debates about altruism, external pressures from evangelical 
Christians, loss of weight within academic biology at the expense of molecular biology (and one may add 
on the top or Ruse’s arguments, at the expense of NASA space and exobiology programs from which 
Lovelock and Margulis precisely both came from). Leaving aside epistemological issues, Ruse argues that 
these sociological factors contribute to explain one specific property of the reception of Gaïa by 
“professional scientists”, namely the “nastiness” of the critiques (pp. 32 & 203). 
 Ruse’s discussion of Gaïa’s reception by “professional scientists” is very well documented and offers the 
reader an interesting and informed view about Gaïa’s history, to the extent that “professional scientists” 
refer to evolutionary biologists. Yet it ignores the fact that evolutionary biologists’ discussions about Gaïa 
have not only been sometimes “nasty”, they have also been very prompt: at most few pages per author in 
this literature. 
The reason for this, I would suggest, is that evolutionary biologists simply did not care about the 
hypothesis. This occurred in part because of the cybernetic framework from which Lovelock presented his 
hypothesis (begging the question of whether it was pertinent to interpret, as it has often been, 
“homeostasis” as an “evolutionary adaptation”), but mostly because the Gaïa hypothesis deals with objects 
and questions evolutionary biologists have never really been interested in: habitability of planets, long-
term history of the atmosphere and climate, erosion of mountains and rocks, global biogeochemical cycles 
and the role of life therein.  
On the other hand, the “professional scientists”, be they enthusiasts or severe critics of the Gaïa 
hypothesis, who discussed in details the objects and mechanisms Lovelock and Margulis brought to the 
fore, the ones who attended the Chapman Conferences dedicated to Gaïa and wrote entire books about the 
hypothesis, no matter the stance (very critical, cold and neutral analysis, or praiseful), were mostly 
geochemists, geologists, atmosphere physicists and chemists, climatologists, oceanographers, modellers 
from Earth sciences, paleontologists, Earth historians, global ecologists. This is another story, different 
from the one Ruse intended to address in this book: it concerns the impact of the Gaïa hypothesis on 
contemporary disciplines located at the interface of geology and biology (geobiology, Earth System 
Science) and its “reception” therein which generated a literature much more abundant than in evolutionary 
biology. Uncovering this other story means engaging in something yet to come that would be a philosophy 
of Earth sciences. One of the merits of Ruse’s book is also, by indicating that the Gaïa hypothesis and its 
story are richer and more interesting than what the usual critiques by philosophers of biology have 
assumed, to indicate there is room for many other, different approaches of the topic, coming from various 
other perspectives.  
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